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Introduction
A common theme that has run through the tax literature is acknowledgment of an internalised willingness to pay tax in the developed democracies of the world, captured in this paper through the concept of 'tax morale' (Frey, 2003; Lewis, 1982; Schmölders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969; Torgler, 2001; Vogel, 1974) . Tax morale has been defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay tax (Frey, 2002) and has been linked by Orvista and Hudson (2002) to 'civic duty'. Torgler and Murphy (2004) ground the concept further by linking it to tax ethics defined by Song and Yarborough (1978) as 'the norms of behaviour governing citizens as taxpayers in their relationship with government'. Torgler (2003) has shown that nations with lower levels of tax morale have higher rates of evasion and avoidance. Other researchers have reported that individuals who have low tax ethics and low tax morale have a greater propensity to cheat on their tax (for reviews, see Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001 ). The recurring theme among researchers interested in tax morale is that governments and authorities need to cultivate tax morale in their taxpaying populations. But how is this done, and more particularly in the context of this paper, how is tax morale 'undone'? Controversial government policy is often linked to the fortunes of politicians. This paper argues that the fortunes of the tax system may also suffer as tax morale is eroded by the implementation of policies that never make it over the hurdle to win popular support.
Theoretical background
Despite the fact that tax morale is frequently acknowledged as relevant to tax compliance, little is known about how it comes into being and how it is best nurtured ). Frey and his colleagues (Frey, 2003; have used Crowding Theory to explain how the quality of the exchange between citizens and their government shapes tax morale. Policy formulation that is inclusive and respectful of citizens (for example, the direct democracy processes found among Swiss cantons) is likely to elicit higher levels of tax morale because the individual is recognized as part of the deliberative process of deciding how taxes should be spent. The notion of governments 'crowding out the internal motivation to pay tax' describes the exclusion of citizens from the deliberative process and the imposition of outside force to ensure that taxes are paid.
The significance of the citizen-government relationship in shaping compliance has always occupied a central place in tax compliance research (for example, Lewis, 1982; Webley, Robben, Elffers, & Hessing, 1991) , sometimes with a focus on trust in government (Scholz & Lubell, 1998) , at other times, fairness in the tax system (Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Smith & Stalans, 1991) . Tyler (1997 Tyler ( , 2001 ) has argued that perceptions of justice, particularly procedural justice, are important in ensuring that authorities have legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Loss of legitimacy accompanies less moral obligation to comply, in this case reduced tax morale.
But what the government does and how it engages with citizens is unlikely to be the only determinant of tax morale. Values, in particular broad social goals about how society should be organized and how resources should be distributed are likely to be important in explaining individual differences in tax morale within a community (Kirchler, 1997; Lewis, 1982) . So too are experiential variables. Individuals who feel personally disadvantaged and regard the tax system as responsible for their experiences of hardship are more likely to have depleted levels of tax morale (Kirchler, 1997; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Wärneryd & Walerud, 1982) .
Purpose and context of the current study
In broad terms, this paper engages with the issue of how aspects of the macro economic system shape the behaviours of citizens. This paper purports that tax morale is influenced by economic conditions created by government policy, specifically Australia's higher education policy. In particular, we aim to examine the extent to which values, opposition to government policy and experiential variables work in concert to shape tax morale among Australian graduates.
In 1989, the federal Labor Government introduced HECS, a scheme that replaced free (to students) tertiary education with a user-pays system subsidized by government. For the most part, Australian higher education institutions are dependent on public funding, and successive governments have remained vigilant, keen to reduce the sector's reliance on the public purse wherever possible. Australian students who obtain a satisfactory tertiary entrance score can pay their fee contribution up-front and receive a 25% discount or they can take out a student loan varying between disciplines, repayable through the Australian Taxation Office when their income exceeds a specified threshold level 1 . Wage and salary earners declare their HECS debt to their employers and the repayment is extracted at source along with income tax. Those who are self-employed need to make an alternative arrangement for repayment with the Tax Office.
Explaining tax morale: Opposition to HECS
On the basis of the arguments of Frey and his colleagues (Frey, 2003; , it might be expected that government policies that are controversial and unpopular run the risk of undermining the tax morale of the disaffected population. In other words, if a segment of the population is opposed to the HECS, that segment might be expected to register a lower level of tax morale than those who are not opposed to the scheme. This relationship should exist independent of whether or not the person is carrying a HECS debt or has benefited from their tertiary education experience.
Explaining tax morale: Basic value orientations
Support for the policy and support for a tax system, however, does not occur in a social and political vacuum (Lewis, 1982) . Basic value orientations that outline our hopes for the society are going to shape attitudes to policy as well as to the tax system (Braithwaite, 2003) . Two value orientations that have been found to underlie the ways in which we respond to social-political issues, policies and interventions are the security and harmony value orientations (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997; Braithwaite, 1982 Braithwaite, , 1994 Braithwaite, , 1998 . This two value model, derived from the work of Rokeach (1973) , and in accord with the conceptual models proposed by others (Katz & Hass, 1988; Lipset, 1963; Rasinski, 1987; Scott, 1960 Both value orientations are expected to increase tax morale (Braithwaite, 2003 (Braithwaite, , 2004 . Or conversely, when citizens have lost interest in social goals of either a security or harmony kind, tax morale can be expected to plummet. In such cases, cynicism has taken the place of hope and individuals lack the conviction that paying tax is the way to achieve a better society (Braithwaite, 2004) .
Because HECS is a user pays system replacing one in which access to higher education was merit based and free to students, the harmony and security values are likely to be associated not only with tax morale, but also opposition to HECS. Those with a strong allegiance to harmony values would be expected to oppose HECS because it undermines the principle of equality of opportunity for all. Those strongly supporting security values are likely to be more comfortable with a user pays system and support HECS. Whether it is welfare or higher education, those who are security oriented have doubts about the desirability of making goods and services freely available without requiring the input of initiative or effort. It is of particular interest that while the security value orientation is predicted to boost support for HECS policy as well as the tax system, the harmony value orientation is predicted to be at odds with HECS policy, but to boost tax system support.
How this cognitive dissonance is resolved is a question addressed in this research. . At the time of this research, the threshold was $21 984 (1999-2000) .
Explaining tax morale: A spill-over from HECS to tax?
At one level, cognitive dissonance between attitudes to government policy and attitudes to tax are common events. In a simple two party democratic political system, a substantial proportion of citizens spend a substantial proportion of their lives living with policies that they do not particularly like. The question then is what are the strategies that individuals use to ensure that disaffection with policy does not spill over into disaffection with the democratic system, and more particularly the tax system. One possibility is psychological containment or segmentation. Opposition to HECS might lead to the feeling that one is not obligated to pay one's HECS debt, but the loss of morale does not extend beyond the HECS domain. In such circumstances, tax morale might be expected to be robust, protected against domain discontent and low morale in relation to paying HECS.
Alternatively, opposition to a policy might not only lower one's feelings of obligation to the authority in that domain, but in other domains as well. Nadler (2002) refers to this as the 'flouting' hypothesis. When individuals perceive one law to be unjust, the resulting resistance extends beyond this specific law to other laws as well. Thus, if law A is regarded as unjust, citizens will be less willing to cooperate with law B. The injustice of the first law taints the second to such an extent that individuals will develop a flouting response to law more broadly.
Testing a research model
The model that is tested in this paper therefore has three theoretically important elements:
(a) values, (b) HECS related attitudes and (c) tax morale. First, the question asked is how do security and harmony values frame the attitudes and cognitions that individuals hold in relation to HECS. These attitudes and cognitions are conceptualised in terms of two dimensions. The first is opposition to HECS as the government policy that has been implemented to fund higher education. The second is HECS morale, or the degree to which people have internalised their formal obligation to pay HECS, accepting this as a responsibility and the right thing to do. Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001 ). It seems plausible that older Australians also will have a more secure financial situation and feel less threatened and disadvantaged by the HECS system.
Method
Sample
The data used in this paper are collected from 447 Australian graduates who completed the Graduates' Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey in 2000 (GHVA Survey; Ahmed 2000; Ahmed, 2004) . New graduates whose degrees were conferred in either 1998 or 1999 were selected for this study as they were expected to have commenced employment by the time the survey was mailed out. The sample was stratified in terms of students graduating from each discipline in two universities in the Australian Capital Territory.
Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed, 447 were returned after several reminders, giving a response rate of 33 per cent (after allowing for undelivered questionnaires and ineligible respondents). This response rate, while low in absolute terms, is comparable with rates reported for other tax-based surveys (Pope, Fayle, & Chen 1993; Kirchler 1999; Wallschutzky 1996; Webley, Adams, & Elffers 2002) . Wallschutzky (1996) has argued that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield higher than a 30 to 40 per cent response rate.
Procedure
The participants were initially sent an introductory letter explaining the intent of the survey and guaranteeing strict confidentiality of responses. The introductory letter explained that the purpose of the survey was to understand how graduates viewed the HECS, how they felt about their tertiary education experiences, and how they would describe their taxpaying behaviour.
After one week, the survey questionnaire was sent along with an accompanying letter and a postage-paid return envelope. The accompanying letter emphasized the research purpose, reiterated the guarantee of respondent anonymity, and encouraged respondents to return the completed questionnaire in a sealed envelope. A two-week return date was requested. An identification number appeared in the questionnaire to allow follow-up reminders of nonrespondents asking them to complete and mail the survey if they had not already done so.
As recommended by Dillman (1991) , a reminder postcard was sent out one week after the initial mailing. Three weeks later, an identical packet was sent out to those participants who had not returned the questionnaire.
Measures
The GHVA Survey was based largely on the Community Hopes, Fears, and Actions Survey (CHFA Survey; Braithwaite, 2000) with some additional items included to assess moral obligation in relation to paying tax as well as repaying a HECS debt, perception of the desirability and practicability of HECS program, and an evaluation of university courses. The measures which provide the database for the current analyses are described below.
Tax morale:
The tax morale scale comprised 8 items measuring the extent to which graduates expressed commitment to the tax system and a belief that taxpaying is socially responsible: 
Having a HECS liability:
This was assessed using a single item: 'Do you have a HECS debt?' (yes = 1, no = 2; reverse coded for analyses). Of the total sample, 65% had a HECS debt and 35% had paid their tuition fees upfront 3 . Among those who claimed to pay upfront, 67% made the full payment and 33% chose the partial upfront payment option. Of those who had paid upfront, 65% reported that they were self-funding, 25% that their parents paid for them, and 10% that employers paid for them. Readers should be cautious in interpreting these figures because the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a respondent's upfront payment can be made by parents at first, then by the student, and finally by the employer (for further details, see Ahmed, 2004 ).
Course satisfaction:
The majority of items used in this scale were adapted from the Graduate Experience
Questionnaire (Long & Hillman, 2000) .
Seventeen items comprising the measure covered four aspects of the university experience: There were six response categories for all items in this measure: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree.
Because these four scales were significantly and positively interrelated (the correlation coefficients ranged from 0.26 to 0.51, p < 0.001), they were combined into one scale to measure respondents' satisfaction with higher education (see Appendix for full listing of items).
Cost salience:
To assess the salience of the cost of university courses for respondents, the following two questions were asked: Did your financial circumstances influence your (a) choice of course? and (b) choice of university? (yes = 1, no = 2). Responses to these two items were reverse scored so that a higher score indicates cost was an issue influencing students' enrolment and/or choice of university. Because scores on these two items were significantly and positively correlated (r = 0.35; p < 0.001), they were averaged to produce one score (M = 1.21; SD = 0.32; alpha = 0.50).
Personal income:
Personal income was measured by asking respondents to tick the income range to which of the sample); and (f) more than $100 000 (covered 2.2% of the sample). To reduce skewness in the scale, two response categories ('$75 001 -$100 000' and 'more than $100 000') were collapsed into one category.
Age, sex and field of study:
Respondents' age was measured in years. Sex was scored 1 for male and 2 for female. To 
Results
Correlational analyses
In order to examine the relationships among the key variables at a bivariate level, two sets of Pearson-product moment correlations were calculated. In Table 1 , social demographic variables and financial hardship variables are correlated with opposition to HECS, HECS morale and tax morale.
Older respondents were more opposed to HECS but had higher tax morale than younger respondents. Sex and field of study were not important correlates of either HECS attitudes or HECS morale or tax morale, although those doing basic Arts courses (the cheapest courses) were more opposed to HECS policy. Those who had lower personal income also were more opposed to HECS policy. Respondents who were carrying a HECS debt had significantly lower HECS morale. HECS morale was also notably lower among those who evaluated their university course negatively. Most notably, those who evaluated their university course negatively were more opposed to HECS policy, had lower HECS morale and lower tax morale. Table 2 , the intercorrelations for the security and harmony value scales, the HECS opposition scale, the HECS morale scale and the tax morale scale are provided. These coefficients support the hypothesized relationships at the bivariate level:
(a) Security values are negatively related to opposition to HECS and positively related to both HECS morale and tax morale.
(b) Harmony values are positively related to opposition to HECS, negatively related to HECS morale and positively related to tax morale. Figure 1 shows the diagrammatic representation of the results of the path analysis 6 using AMOS version 4.0 with maximum likelihood estimation (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) . Tax .39
Path analysis
Figure 1: Results of a path analysis showing the interrelationships among relevant variables
As evident from Figure 1 , the path analysis shows four variables having direct effects on tax morale. Those who are older and those who support harmony values have higher levels of tax morale. Tax morale surprisingly is also strengthened by HECS opposition. This finding, which was not hypothesized, most likely reflects the position that a significant proportion of Australians (and others) espouse: Education should be available to all and 6 Social demographic variables that did not play a significant role in the path analysis were excluded from the final model. These were sex, field of study (coded Band 1 versus others), cost salience, and personal income. Their exclusion did not affect the magnitude of the coefficients of the variables included in the model. paid for by higher taxes if necessary (Johnstone, 2003; Marginson, 1997; Evatt Foundation Group, 1999; Wilson & Breusch, 2003) . Thus, opposition to HECS can strengthen commitment to the tax system.
The major variable lowering tax morale in Figure 1 is HECS morale. This model provides evidence of Nadler's (2002) This somewhat pivotal variable of opposition to HECS policy maintains its very strong link to HECS morale in the path diagram. Opposition to HECS weakens the internalised responsibility to pay HECS. HECS morale also is adversely affected by having a HECS debt and course dissatisfaction. And HECS morale, or the loss of HECS morale, appears to be the greatest threat to tax morale in Figure 1 .
Overall, the final model provided an excellent fit to the empirical data as shown by seven different goodness-of-fit indices 8 . All fit statistics are presented in Table 3 including the significant paths in the final model with their standardized beta coefficients. As Table 3 presents, the chi-square was non-significant [c 2 (9, N = 442) = 11.21, p < 0.26], the chisquare/df ratio was 1.25, the GFI was 0.994, the AGFI was 0.975, the CFI was 0.996, the TLI was 0.988, and the RMSEA was 0.024. The modification indices indicated no potential improvement in the model fit with either the elimination or addition of paths.
The path analysis explained moderate levels of variance were explained in policy discontent (R 2 = 0.16) and tax morale (R 2 = 0.15) while a substantial amount of variance was explained in HECS morale (R 2 = 0.47).
considered as acceptable. Values greater than 0.95 for GFI, AGFI, GFI, and TLI are considered to indicate good model fit (Byrne, 1994; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Loehlin, 1998 ). An RMSEA of 0.05 or less is suggested as an indicator of acceptable fit (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999; Bollen, 1989) . (Frey, 2002 (Frey, , 2003 are right, the answer is discursive, and involves government winning over the hearts and minds of the people. Most tax administrators, however, would prefer a technical solution since they have no control over the political process as such. It is an empirical question, however, whether or not technology can quell flouting. To the extent that flouting is associated with reactance, attempted control may aggravate rather than alleviate threats to tax morale.
While the link between HECS morale and tax morale is of central importance because of its policy relevance, other findings in this paper demonstrate the principles by which economic and psychological variables work together to shape tax morale. Values, in the form of shared goals about the kind of society we consider desirable, play an important part in influencing views of policies such as HECS and taxation more generally, and these influences prevail after controlling for variables that reflect self-interest. By the same token, self-interest is important. Those who were not satisfied with their university course and who have a HECS debt not only oppose HECS but also feel less willing to meet their obligations to pay HECS. Together these findings show that neither HECS morale, nor tax morale can be explained satisfactorily in either self-interested or collective terms. Both kinds of influence are at work. Because they endure over time, values act as a stabilizing influence, giving tax morale a certain kind of robustness against controversy and upheaval.
Personal circumstances and opposition to particular government policies, in contrast, are destabilizing influences, causing tax morale to fluctuate. As such, tax morale may not only be an important determinant of compliance, but also a useful barometer for judging how the tax system is going. Tax morale will build up in good times, be eroded in bad times, but withstand policy controversy as long as adjustments are made to restore morale to the level necessary for a well-functioning democracy.
